Discovery · Historic | DRAM Cartel, 24 Years Later
The sentence sits on page 20, after the footnotes and the string cites, and it is the kind of line a judge writes knowing it will be quoted. The defendants had invoked the late Judge Richard Posner, who once observed that "competitors in concentrated markets watch each other like hawks." U.S. District Judge Noël Wise accepted the premise and then turned it inside out. The plaintiffs' allegations, she wrote, "go beyond hawks watching each other; their contentions are more akin to hawks flying in formation – an activity that hawks ordinarily do not do." With that, on November 14, 2026, she denied the motion to dismiss in Garciaguirre v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., No. 5:26-cv-06345-NW (N.D. Cal.), and pushed a case about the price of the world's most ordinary chip into discovery. What follows is what the twenty-page order actually says — and what it deliberately does not.
The plaintiffs are not a trade group and not a rival manufacturer. They are seventeen consumers and small businesses from five states: people who buy the memory that goes into laptops, phones and data-center servers, or who assemble machines for others. They filed on June 25, 2026, alleging a single continuing agreement in restraint of trade from October 2022 onward, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and the antitrust and consumer-protection statutes of California, Florida, Minnesota, New York and Wisconsin. The conduct they describe comes in four movements: simultaneous production cuts between October 26, 2022 and April 7, 2023; a coordinated pivot to high-bandwidth memory, or HBM, beginning in March 2023; a coordinated exit from DDR4 and DDR3 production across 2024 and 2025; and, after the third quarter of 2025, a refusal to re-expand conventional DRAM supply. The complaint's own phrase for all of it is conduct "contrary to all economic and business logic."
Start with who is left in the market. In the 1990s, roughly twenty firms manufactured DRAM. Consolidation left three. As of the third quarter of 2025, SK hynix (33.2%), Samsung (32.6%) and Micron (25.7%) together controlled more than 91% of global DRAM revenue, with small specialty makers and a few Chinese firms splitting the remaining roughly 8%. In 2016, Samsung alone held about half the market while the other two trailed; today the three are near-equals — a shift the court paused on, because it means cuts by SK hynix and Micron are no longer simple follow-the-leader moves. Then come the numbers the plaintiffs attach to that structure. During the "DRAM winter" of 2022–2023, Samsung's semiconductor division reported a $3.51 billion operating loss in the first quarter of 2023, SK hynix $2.61 billion, and Micron a $5.833 billion net loss for the fiscal year ending August 31, 2023. By the third quarter of 2025, conventional DRAM prices had risen 171.8% in a single year. At the contract level they climbed about 50% in Q4 2025, 93% in Q1 2026 and 58% in Q2 2026; retail DRAM rose 500% from early October 2025. The headline number in the complaint — an allegation, not a finding — is 697% over eighteen months.
A production cut is easy to reverse, which is why antitrust law has never treated one as proof of anything. What made this case different, in the court's reading, is that the defendants' moves could not be unwound. HBM is DRAM stacked vertically — it "sacrifices everything for bandwidth," as the complaint puts it — and it consumes roughly three to four times the silicon wafer area per gigabyte compared with conventional DDR5. Plaintiffs allege all three defendants redirected capacity and capital toward it, raising HBM's share of their capacity roughly tenfold. In October 2025, Samsung and SK hynix reportedly signed preliminary agreements to supply OpenAI's Stargate data-center project with up to 900,000 DRAM wafers per month, a commitment that would dedicate about 40% of total worldwide DRAM output to a single customer, while — the complaint alleges — declining long-term agreements with major conventional DRAM customers. On December 3, 2025, with prices at historic highs, Micron said it would close Crucial, its thirty-year-old direct-to-consumer brand. New fabrication plants were delayed, lithography additions were "limited." The result, in the complaint's words: "despite these extraordinary prices — the single most powerful supply signal the DRAM industry has ever produced — not one of the three Defendants expanded or announced plans to meaningfully expand commodity DRAM production capacity." The court's test for such conduct is "extreme action against self-interest," meaning action "so perilous in the absence of advance agreement that no reasonable firm would make the challenged move without such an agreement." It found the test met.
The most unusual allegation is administrative, and it arrives in January 2026. According to the complaint, each defendant "simultaneously implemented enhanced due diligence and customer vetting procedures for DRAM orders." A GPU and server supplier executive — a customer of the defendants — described what that looked like: "The three companies became stricter and asked us about who we will supply to, how much quantity, and if the demand of our customers [is] real." The court called the simultaneous adoption of the same order-vetting questions "difficult to explain absent coordination," noted that it handed each defendant "a structured view of who is purchasing DRAM and in what quantities," and added the line that will follow these companies into discovery: the customer policing "bears a direct resemblance to the monitoring mechanisms of the 1998–2002 cartel." Timing did the rest. January 2026 came after the AI boom began in 2023, after the HBM pivot, and at or about the moment when conventional DRAM profits overtook HBM's — so the innocent explanation that "booming AI demand had consumed available capacity" does not line up with the calendar.
Which brings the case back to 1998. From 1998 to 2002, the three defendants and two other manufacturers ran a criminal cartel to fix DRAM prices. The U.S. Department of Justice investigation produced guilty pleas from four companies — a $185 million fine from Hynix, $300 million from Samsung — and the prosecution of numerous executives, including five Samsung executives, one of whom served eight months in federal prison and was subsequently promoted to President of Samsung Germany in 2009 and President of Samsung Europe in 2014. Micron participated in the cartel and received immunity for cooperating as a whistleblower. Two decades later, the same three companies were accused again, over a 165% price spike between August 2016 and August 2018. That class action, filed on April 27, 2018, was dismissed with prejudice and the dismissal was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in 2022. The defendants argued this was a rerun. The court held it was not, and worked through eight "plus factors": it rejected two (public statements to investors, and meetings at industry conferences), treated market structure as neutral, and found the rest — the HBM pivot and related lock-ups, the delayed fabs, the DDR4 exit, the customer vetting, and "Defendants' Historic Behavior" — in the plaintiffs' favor. The 1998–2002 convictions still count, the court wrote, because "the present allegations involve the same alleged coordination and actors."
📊 KEY FACT-CHECK — WHAT THE ORDER DOES AND DOES NOT SAY
What it does: denies the defendants' motion to dismiss; the case proceeds to discovery; at this stage the court must accept the plaintiffs' well-pleaded allegations as true and draw inferences in their favor.
What it does not do: find that an agreement existed, rule on liability, or admit a single document into evidence. Nothing in the order establishes that prices were fixed.
Verified from the order (Doc. 68, Nov. 14, 2026): combined share of more than 91% of global DRAM revenue in Q3 2025; the 1998–2002 fines of $185 million (Hynix) and $300 million (Samsung); Micron's whistleblower immunity; answers due December 7, 2026; case management conference reset to January 12, 2027.
Attributed to the plaintiffs, not established: the 697% price increase over eighteen months, the 900,000-wafer-per-month Stargate commitment, and the assertion that the three companies coordinated rather than converged.
None of this is a verdict, and it is worth being precise about how far it goes. A motion to dismiss tests whether a complaint states a plausible claim, not whether it is true; the court said as much when it noted that a plaintiff "need not allege a fact pattern that tends to exclude the possibility of lawful, independent conduct." What the order does is unlock discovery — internal capacity planning, allocation decisions, the documents behind those customer-vetting questions, and the communications of executives who, the plaintiffs allege, "gathered before each move." Samsung, SK hynix and Micron must answer by December 7, 2026, and the initial case management conference is set for January 12, 2027, at 9:00 a.m. The two Korean companies are the world's first and second largest memory makers, so what surfaces in that discovery will be read in Seoul as closely as in San Jose. And the question the case now turns on is narrow and unglamorous: not whether memory became expensive — anyone who priced a laptop this year knows it did — but whether three companies that plugged their output into the AI boom can show, document by document, that each of them decided the same things at the same time for reasons of its own. The hawks have been asked to explain the formation.
[심층 탐사] 편대를 이룬 매들 — 697% 폭등, 그리고 각하되지 않은 소송
Discovery · Historic | 24년 만에 다시 열린 DRAM 담합의 기록
문장은 20쪽, 각주와 판례 인용이 끝난 자리에 놓여 있다. 인용될 것을 알고 쓰는 판사의 문장이다. 피고들은 고(故) 리처드 포즈너 판사의 말을 끌어왔다. "집중된 시장의 경쟁자들은 서로를 매처럼 지켜본다." 노엘 와이즈 미국 연방지법 판사는 그 전제를 받아들이고, 뒤집었다. 원고들의 주장은 "서로를 지켜보는 매의 수준을 넘어, 편대를 이루어 나는 매에 가깝다. 매가 평소 하지 않는 일이다." 2026년 11월 14일, 그 한 문장과 함께 캘리포니아 북부 연방지법은 삼성전자·SK하이닉스·마이크론의 각하신청을 기각하고, 세상에서 가장 흔한 반도체의 가격을 다투는 이 사건을 증거개시(디스커버리) 단계로 넘겼다.
Korean Version: [심층 탐사] 편대를 이룬 매들 — 24년 만에 열린 DRAM 담합 697% 폭등, 그리고 각하되지 않은 소송
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